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Chapter XII
Submarine Mines In International Law
by
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr.*

The extensive and organized use of explosive submarine mines is primarily
a creature of the twentieth century, although more primitive devices date
back to far earlier times. During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, the
establishment of a Russian minefield outside Port Arthur generated much
criticism. 1 It was this outcry that led to the negotiation of the Hague
Convention (VIII) of 1907 Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Mines. 2 Since that time, both the pattern of usage of submarine mines, and
the technology involved, have changed, and these changes have raised issues
concerning the state of international law on this subject. The question is
whether evolution in mine warfare technology requires modification of
traditional rules of international law, and, if so, what changes are required?
There has always been an internal tension inherent in the law of mine
warfare. Two important underlying principles are at stake. On the one hand,
the doctrine of the freedom of navigation is one of the hoariest and most
fundamental in the law of the sea. On the other, the long-recognized principle
of self-defense has great force. The international law of mine warfare brings
into play an attempt, under varying circumstances, to balance these
fundamental norms. In seeking to strike an appropriate balance, many
different factors and elements must be taken into consideration. In various
situations, certain elements, such as the existence 'of a state of war, the nature
of the interests of the mining state, the location of the proposed mining, and
the type or category of mine involved, among others, playa role.
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Warfare (NWP 9)3 initiates
its discussion of naval mines with the following statement: "The general
principles of law embodied in the 1907 Convention continue to serve as a
guide to lawful employment of naval mines."4 In examining this statement,
one must first note that the Hague Convention deals with the use of mines
by belligerents, which traditionally meant in time of war. In order to accept
the Hague Convention as a guide to the employment of mines, it is necessary
first to do away with the argument that since the Charter of the United
Nations has "done away" with aggressive warfare as a legal concept, there
no longer exist such corollary concepts as "belligerency" and "neutrality."
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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If one were to accept this neat theory, then the Convention, being contrary
to the spirit of the Charter, could not be a legal basis for the employment
of submarine mines. Advocates of this position have argued that reference
must be made, to support the Convention's rules, to humanitarian laws or
to reliance upon the right of self-defense authorized by the Charter.6
To my mind, the argument is specious and could bring about undesirable
consequences. To argue that war no longer exists flies in the face of reality.
Armed conflict continues, though not on the scale of the two World Wars.
One would have to be blind to the facts, indeed, to claim that the Charter
has in fact eliminated war in the sense of the use of armed force, or to paper
over the issue by calling war by a different name.
It must also be recognized that not permitting the rules of war for regulating
conduct in "in-between" situations such as conflict involving a limited use
offorce would, in most cases, result either in formal declarations of war before
such concepts as blockade or limitations on mine warfare could be called into
play, or the acceptance of unregulated violence. This idea is inconsistent with
the entire theory of the humanitarian law of armed conflict, whose principles
are applicable irrespective of whether a formal state of war exists or the
"rightness" or "wrongness" of the parties to the conflict.7 This is clearly not
a desirable outcome. Thus, Thorpes has noted that a consequence of this
position is that no assistance can be derived from these older rules at times
when operational commanders most need that assistance. He says, "It is very
important to remember that the actual practice of states, if generally accepted
or even tolerated, is a most potent force in shaping the law, and in the twilight
area between the traditional concept of peace and war it is clearly sensible
to draw assistance where one can from the traditional law of war, and this,
I suggest, states have done."9 This is compelling reasoning.
Thorpe gives some examples of the state practice to which he refers. These
examples demonstrate that in certain special situations, particularly those that
involve some aspects of national security, the international community has
not objected to interferences with the use of the high seas.
Thorpe's first example is the case of the West Breeze. This ship, a British
merchantman, was stopped on the high seas en route to Casablanca by a French
warship. The French believed she carried arms and contraband for Algerian
rebels. When stopped and searched, she was within a 32-mile security zone
that the French had established off the Algerian coast. After being searched,
with no contraband discovered, the vessel was permitted to proceed on its
way.l0 Thorpe's second example, more familiar to us all, was the interdiction
of offensive weapons destined for Cuba in 1962.11
Each of the examples illustrates an interference with the freedom of the
high seas, and in both instances the objective was the protection of the security
of the state carrying out an act which otherwise would be in violation of
internationallaw. 12 In the Algerian situation, it is clear that the boarding and
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searching of the British vessel in peacetime would have been contrary to
international law. The right of a warship to visit and search is a right confmed,
on the high seas, to belligerents. In the Cuban interdiction, normally referred
to as "quarantine," the activities undertaken by the u.s. Navy resembled,
but were not identical to, a blockade. The right of blockade, like the right
of visit, is a right of a belligerent. In this regard, they both are similar to
the right to lay mines. That the activity was conducted in a limited way is
suggestive of application of the laws of war. Thorpe's point, therefore, is
that state practice continues to support the application of the laws of war,
and thus it is legitimate to say that the Hague Convention remains a valid
set of guidelines with respect to the employment of mines, unless it can be
shown that these rules do not adequately serve the newer technologies that
have been developed.
There is no doubt that the Hague rules were developed to be utilized in
time of war.1 3 These rules do not render the use of naval mines illegal. Rather,
they provide for certain restrictions for the purpose of protecting neutral
shipping. While regarding mining as legal in proper circumstances, one must
be mindful of the provisions of other relevant conventions. For example,
Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts prohibits
weapons"of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. "14
Given that this Protocol comes some 70 years after the Hague Convention,
and taking account of the state practice and attitudes of maritime states in
the interim, it can hardly be argued that the Protocol was aimed at mines.
The Hague rules themselves were designed to limit the effect of mines on
neutral shipping. Likewise, the similar language used in Hague Convention
No. IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on LandiS should
not be viewed as limiting the Hague rules regarding mines. As was argued
above, state practice seems to support the principle that the rules have certain
applicability in conditions short of formal war, such as periods of high
tensions, where the need to protect neutral shipping is just as strong as in
wartime. Accordingly, I shall examine first what the rules provide for in
wartime, and then move to questions of restrictions during peacetime and
periods of high tension or undeclared hostilities, such as the Vietnam conflict.
It will be necessary, in each case, to address the question of the impact of
new technologies, today and in the future, on the application of rules
structured to deal with mines as they were known at the time the Convention
was negotiated.
To begin with, the Hague rules do not by their terms differentiate between
various zones of the oceans, except that article 2 proscribes the laying of
"automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole
object of intercepting commercial shipping."16 Obviously, the qualification
contained in that phrase creates a yawning loophole in the prohibition, since
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it could easily be circumvented by arguing that the mines were laid for another
purpose, e.g., a legitimate blockade. Thus, belligerents have the right to lay
mines in their own territorial seas and internal waters, and in many instances
in those of the enemy. While the Convention does not expressly refer to the
high seas, and thus mines may also be sown there, a reasonable inference is
that such laying should not be done indiscriminately and should be restricted
to reasonably limited areas. Article 3 requires "every possible precaution"
to protect peaceful shipping and, when the minefield is no longer under
surveillance, notification of the danger zones as soon as military exigencies
permit. 17 Neutral powers are permitted to mine their own waters18 and, by
implication, belligerents may not do so because such mining would be a
violation of the neutral's sovereignty. The Convention applies to anchored
automatic contact mines, and also to unanchored contact mines, which are
prohibited except when constructed to become harmless one hour at most
after control is lost over them. 19 Anchored mines must also become harmless
if they should break their moorings. 20
How should these rules be interpreted with respect to more modem devices
not envisaged at the time they were adopted? The principles they embody
give us some guidance.
As previously noted, the Hague rules were not designed to prohibit mines
as a weapon, but rather to place limitations upon their use that relate to
maintaining control over them to protect neutral shipping. This is implicit
in rules requiring anchored mines to neutralize themselves should they break
loose from their moorings, rules prohibiting unanchored mines that do not
neutralize within an hour, rules requiring belligerents to do their utmost to
remove mines at the cessation ofhostilities,21 and rules regarding notice. Thus
it can be inferred that new, high technology mines should be acceptable if
they satisfy the same objectives. New weapons that are under an acceptable
level of control by the party laying them, or which do not threaten neutral
surface shipping, would seem to be acceptable. One such weapon referred
to by Thorpe is the continental-shelf mine. He notes that this mine will be
a "short tethered rocket-propelled warhead" that is designed to be remotely
activated by acoustic link telemetry.22 Given the degree of control over this
device, it is likely that its use would not create the kind of hazards which
the Hague rules were conceived to prevent. Since these mines would likely
be deployed beyond the territorial sea, however, the proscriptions requiring
localization and notice would seem to be applicable.
But should one speculate that it is possible that these rocket-propelled
devices could be deployed with nuclear capability, then I believe the
conclusion should be otherwise. This prospect raises the question whether
such devices would be prohibited by the Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons anq. Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and Subsoil Thereof. 23 While it could
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be argued that tethered mines are not "emplaced" on the ocean floor, that
argument is transparently thin. A nuclear-tipped continental-shelf mine
clearly violates the spirit if not the letter of that treaty. Nor does it help
the issue much to argue that since these rockets might be directed only at
belligerent submarines, and thus pose little if any risk to surface shipping,
they are not precluded. By the better logic, keeping in mind the probable
reaction of neutrals to the emplacement of such weapons, the Hague rules
seem to exclude them from use. Other conceivable new technologies could
be examined along similar lines.
Are the same rules applicable in peacetime? In examining this question,
it is necessary to distinguish between time of unquestioned peace, that is, the
complete lack of hostilities in the area, and time of peace in which there are
nonetheless existing hostilities. This is the situation that obtains in an
"undeclared war" where the rules of belligerency and neutrality do not apply,
at least in the formal sense. Some insight can be gained in this latter category
by examining the Corfu Channel Case'M decided by the International Court of
Justice in 1949. It can be recalled that the major issue in that case was whether
states in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits
used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without
the previous authorization of a coastal state, provided that the passage is
innocent. The court held in the affirmative. But a second issue arose as a
result of the fact that at one point two British destroyers struck mines in
the Albanian portion of the channel causing considerable damage and loss
of life. The Court agreed with the British contention that Albania was
responsible. It held that this responsibility rested on the basis of elementary
principles of humanity, and the principle that every state has an obligation
not knowingly to permit acts in its territory contrary to the rights of other
states. The holding, therefore, recognized a customary international law right
to mine one's own territorial sea, but also a duty to notify of the presence
and location of those mines.
Rules concerning the peaceful uses of the oceans are governed by treaty
law. Both the Geneva Conventions of 195825 and the 1982 U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea26 address such questions. Although the 1982 treaty is
not yet in force,27 there are relevant provisions representing at least emerging
rules of customary international law prior to the Convention's entry into
force.
What are the implications of its provisions with respect to the question
of peacetime mining of the territorial sea? Article 17 accords the right of
innocent passage to all vessels navigating in the territorial sea.28 Article 24
proscribes the coastal state from hampering that right. Initially, then, one
might argue that emplacement of mines in the territorial sea by the coastal
State would hamper the right of innocent passage. However, article 25 makes
it clear that the coastal State may suspend that right for reasons of security,

356

Law of Naval Operations

at least temporarily, in specified areas of its territorial sea. It would thus seem
that mines could be laid in such areas or other areas in which there might
be no substantial vessel traffic. Article 24(2) places an obligation on the coastal
state to give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation. Furthermore,
article 22 permits a coastal state, for safety of navigation, to restrict passage
of foreign vessels to certain specified sea lanes or traffic separation schemes.
Reading these together, it would appear that a coastal state in peacetime could
mine its territorial sea, provided that the notice required by article 24 is given.
Limiting passage to safe areas and times would hardly be considered
"hampering" the general right of innocent passage in such circumstances,
because that term means actions of a coastal state that would discriminate
among foreign ships, or restrict vessels in the territorial sea that would
virtually deprive them of their legal right to innocent passage. It does not
proscribe reasonable regulation.
Article 38 of the treaty, in what some believe to be new law, provides
for the right of transit passage for vessels passing through straits used for
international navigation. This right, unlike innocent passage, is not
suspendable. Like innocent passage, however, littoral states must give
publicity to known dangers. 29 Because these passageways are sometimes only
a mile or less wide, and because they often are vital waterways for
international trade and military use, it is more than likely that any attempt
to mine them would meet with instant protests from major maritime nations.
I would conclude, therefore, that mining of international straits in peacetime
would not be acceptable under customary rules. The same would hold true
for routes designated as archipelagic sea lanes, subject to archipelagic sea lanes
passage.30
It would seem difficult, in general, to justify the laying of mines on the
high seas, beyond national jurisdiction, absent some strong showing that
would engage a coastal state's traditional right to defend itself. In peacetime,
a claim of self-defense justifying such a strong measure would be difficult
to demonstrate. Again, laying of high seas mines would most likely be viewed
by maritime states as an unreasonable interference with the freedom of
navigation on the high seas guaranteed by article 87. The navigation rights
contained in that article are incorporated into the exclusive economic zone
rules by a cross-reference in article 58, while the rights of the coastal State
in that zone are limited by article 56 to those that are essentially economic
in nature. Thus the rules in the EEZ should be the same, as regards peacetime
minelaying, as for the high seas beyond. This conclusion is reinforced by
article 88, also applicable in the EEZ, which specifies that the high seas are
reserved for peaceful purposes. 31 Finally, attention should be called to article
300, that calls upon all state parties to the Convention to exercise their rights,
freedoms, and jurisdiction in a manner that would not amount to an abuse
of rights. It would seem that mining other thaD. in restricted areas of the
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territorial sea in peacetime would raise that issue.32 Arguably, however, the
emplacement of such weapons as the continental-shelf mine, previously
referred to, in the high seas or the EEZ might be distinguished on the grounds
that they are controlled and inert until activated, thus posing no threat to
surface shipping. Technically, these devices are not mines at all while inert,
and thus their emplacement in peacetime would not be proscribed, nor would
notice of that emplacement be required. Such emplacement arguably could
be justified on the ground referred to by Myers McDougal as a "preparation
for self-defense. "33
Returning once again to the special "peacetime" situation where tensions
or even hostilities not amounting to a formal war exist in an area, the question
is whether a different set of rules do or ought to apply.34 The most recent
and classic example of this situation was the Viet Nam "war." During that
conflict the United States mined Haiphong Harbor. Thorpe calls this "the
most interesting [mining] case since 1945."35 Mining of the harbor was first
considered in 1968, but was rejected on the grounds that there was in fact
no great military need to cut off military supplies flowing from the Soviet
Union to North Viet Nam. At the time, the Director of the International
Law Division, U.S. Navy Office of the Judge Advocate General, said: "If
a legal state of war existed between the United States and North Vietnam
we could immediately blockade the port of Hai-phong as a belligerent right
of warfare. Without a state of war such a blockade would be of doubtful
legality. A similar analysis could be made with respect to ~ning harbors,
contraband, neutrality, and the right of visit and search on the high seas."36
Note that this statement seems to rest on the traditional notions of war and
peace. But by 1972, conditions had changed considerably. A major North
Vietnamese offensive had been mounted and it was now necessary for purposes
of military defense to stem the flow of Soviet weapons to the south. Thorpe
describes the situation as follows:
The solution to the tactical problems of the mining had to allow the objectives to be
achieved without unnecessary risk to international shipping. If Hague Convention No.
VIII applied to unmoored influence mines and if instant notification was required, the
mine-laying aircraft in subsequent waves would be at risk. In fact the decision was taken
to lay in the internal waters and territorial seas of North Vietnam inactive mines that
would become active after a period of 3 days, and give warning to all shipping once
the aircraft had all returned. Of the 36 ships in harbor at Hai-Phong at the time of
the announcement over one-quarter were under way within 3 hr. No ships were lost,
the traffic to and from Hai-Phong was effectively disrupted and, of course, the
departures from Vietnam and the release of prisoners of war followed shortly thereafter.
The mining was justified and reported in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter
by the U.S.A. as an exercise of the right of self-defense in view of the attack against
South Vietnam and the need to protect the 60,000 remaining U.S. Troops.37

What was the reaction of the international community? Very little. In a
letter from the representative of the U.S.S.R. to the President of the Security
Council, the Soviets protested the mining, saying that the U.S. action was
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a violation of the freedom of the high seas (even though the mines were in
internal waters and the territorial sea), and rejected the u.s. claim of selfdefense. The letter stated "that no aggression has been committed against
the United States. On the contrary, the United States itself is acting as an
aggressor in Viet-Nam."38 A similar letter was submitted by the People's
Republic of China.39 Neither protest made any mention whatsoever of the
Hague Convention or the customary law of mine warfare.
Reference again should be made to the analogous use of the belligerent
right of blockade. As previously noted, the Cuban quarantine was not a
traditional blockade because it did not fulfIll the formal requirements. Nor
was there a state of war in existence between the United States and Cuba.
That event represents a modified rule of blockade responsive to and justified
by the needs of the situation at the time. The justification was on the ground
of collective self-defense under the Rio Pact of 1947. The widespread support
among members of the Organization of American States supplied the
necessary opinio juris. One commentator noted that "the Cuban situation
illustrates that where the circumstances are right, a state will insist, even in
a peacetime situation, to what was traditionally known as a belligerent right.
The question today really is not a purely legal one, and it never really was. "40
Dean Acheson went further in a comment to the American Society of
International Law, when he said: "I must conclude that the propriety of the
Cuban quarantine is not a legal issue.... No law can destroy the state creating
the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law. "41 To me, however,
basing the quarantine on raw power, and not the law, is a most dangerous
proposition.
The foregoing examples indicate a growing state practice embodying some
of th~ rules regarding the law of war in a situation short of war. These
examples are buttressed by the ruling of the International Court of Justice
in the Nicaragua Case.42 In that case, the Court found that on a date late
in 1983 or early 1984, the President of the United States authorized a United
States government agency to lay mines in Nicaraguan ports; that in early 1984,
mines were laid in or close to the ports of EI Bluff, Cormto and Puerto
Sandino, either in Nicaraguan internal waters or in its territorial sea or both,
by persons in the pay of that agency. It found that at no time did the United
States issue any public warning to international shipping of the existence and
location of the mines. It found further that personal and material injury was
caused by the explosion of the mines. The Court decided that by laying these
mines, the United States acted in breach of its obligations under customary
international law not to use force against another state, not to intervene in
its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty, and not to interrupt peaceful maritime
commerce. While the holding does not deal with the law of mine warfare
as discussed here, a plea of self-defense was rejected. Clearly, even under
the Hague rules, such mining cannot be defended.
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Before concluding this commentary, some attention should be devoted to
the operations that have recently taken place in the Persian Gulf. The author
is not privy to any facts not appearing in the public media, so the underlying
assumption is that they are fairly reported, which may indeed not be the case.
The reflagging by the u.s. of eleven Kuwaiti tankers brought about a number
of responses from Iran, including the indiscriminate laying of mines in various
areas of the Persian Gulf. Assuming that some, if not most, of these areas
lie outside of anyone's territorial sea, did Iran have the right to lay these mines
under the rules that we have examined? First of all, the activities under
examination took place during a limited conflict. This introduces more vividly
the element of self-defense. But the question is whether Iran's targeting of
shipping owned by a neighboring, but only arguably neutral, state under the
flag of a noncombatant can be supported by the concept of self-defense. The
answer depends upon how one views that traditional international righ::.
Professor Jack Grunawalt of the Naval War College views self-defense as
broader than traditional approaches would have us believe. It is his contention
that the experiences of the two World Wars demonstrate that much of the
law of neutrality has been ignored, and that in time of war, one of the weapons
utilized was the all-out attack on the movement of goods to and from a
belligerent, whether carried in neutral hulls or not. The objective was to
destroy the enemy's economic capacity to maintain the war. If one perceives
the destruction of Iraqi oil (or that of its supporters) in the same light, the
argument can be made on Iran's behalf in the Persian Gulf. In reference to
the Persian Gulf, Professor Grunawalt has said: "I would suggest to you that
the law ought to recognize that neutral shipping that sustains a belligerent's
warfighting capability may be subject to interdiction by whatever platforms
and weapons system are available to the other side to accomplish that purpose.
I would also suggest that the modern law of neutrality, as reflected in the
customary practice of nations in this century, does in fact support that
result. "43 Given the prior analysis of the mining of Haiphong harbor by the
United States, it would appear that his argument has a basis in practice, and,
if properly carried out, is acceptable to most maritime powers. I must confess
that, while I am drawn to the logic of the argument, I am deeply concerned
that if carried to extremes it could destroy the very concept of neutrality
and in large part the freedom of the seas. No ship, no cargo would be safe
in an area of conflict. But even if the premise is accepted, the differences
between the existing situation and that in Viet Nam are notable in the manner
in which the mining was carried out. As we have previously noted, mining
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction can be supported where there is
a legitimate national security objective. Even then, the rules regarding
localization and notification must be followed, as they were in Haiphong.
Thus the indiscriminate, non-notified mining by Iran cannot be found to be
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within the rules. Whether the u.s. response in attacking and sinking the minelaying vessel is within the bounds of reasonable response is a separate issue.
In conclusion, a good argument can be made that the Hague Convention
rules continue to be viable in this age of new technology, that they provide
reasonable rules of conduct, and that these rules seem to be recognized and
followed. Thus the rules remain good guidelines for the operational
commander, and the Handbook under discussion correctly sets them forth for
the purpose.
Notes
• Professor of Law, University of Miami
1. H.A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea, 3d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1959), p. 119.
2. Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 18, 1907,
U.S. Statutes at Large, v. 36, p. 2332, Treaty Series No. 541 [hereinafter Hague VIII].
3. U.S. Navy Dept., The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9 (Washington:
1987) [hereinafter the Commander's Handbook].
4. Id., par. 9.2.
5. Humanitarian principles have been used to require notification of mining apart from the Hague
Convention. In the Corfu Channel Case, the Court referred to the obligation on Albania to notify of the
existence of mines, saying, "Such obligations are based not on the Hague Convention No. VIII of 1907
which is applicable in time of war but to certain general and well-recognized principles, namely elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war, the principle of the freedom of
maritime communications and every state's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states." Hague, International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel Case
([The Hague]: The Court, 1949), v. 4.
6. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations." Professor Janis, in commenting, notes that "concommitant with Article 51 's right
to self-defense is Article 2(4)'s prohibition against 'the threat or use of force against the .territorial integrity
or political independence of any state. '" Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law (Boston: Little
Brown, 1988), p. 124; see also,Janis, "Neutrality," Chapter VI herein.
7. See, for example, common Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements [hereinafter U.S.T.] v. 6, p. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362;
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, U.S.T., v. 6, p. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Convention (III) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,1949, U.S.T., v. 6, p. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Convention
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, U.S.T., v. 6, p. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 19n, art. I, Offiaal Records
ofthe Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development ofHumanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
Geneva (1974-1977), v. I, p. 115, reproduced in Dietrich Shindler & J. Toman (eds.), The Laws of Armed
Conflict: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, 3rd ed. (Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), p. 621 (hereinafter Additional Protocol I).
8. A.G.Y. Thorpe, "Mine Warfare at Sea - Some Legal Aspects for the Future," Ocean Development
and International Law, v. 18, p. 255 at p. 256 (1987).
9. rd., p. 257.
10. See, Anna Van Zwanenberg, "Interference with Ships on the High Seas," International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, v. 10, p. 785 at p. 791 (1961).
11. For details, see, Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off. 1963), v. 4, pp. 523-24.
12. Article 22 of the Geneva Convention of the High Seas prohibits boarding a foreign merchant ship
on the high seas unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy or
the slave trade, or is of the same nationality as the boarding ship though showing a different flag.
Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, U.S.T. v. 13, p. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.

Clingan

361

13. The Hague Convention applies to belligerents. Article 7 states that "The provisions of the present
Convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are
parties to the Convention." Hague VIII, supra note 2.
14. Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 35, para. 2.
15. Convention (IV) Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land, Regulations Annex, Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 23{e), U.S. Statutes at Large, v. 36, p. 2227, Malloy, v. 2, p. 2269.
16. Hague VIII, supra note 2, art. 2.
17. IJ., art. 3, second paragraph.
18. IJ., art. 4.
19. IJ., art. 1 (1).
20. IJ., art. 1 (2).
21. IJ., art. 5.
22. He elaborates: "Modern technology allows for the possibility of interrogating the weapon remotely
to ascertain its state of anning. If the weapon breaks loose, it will become sterilized. The mine will have
sensors that could have discriminatory devices built in. The remote anning devices have a high reliability
factor that transforms the mine into a highly discriminatory weapon, and, if designated as an antisubmarine
warfare weapon, will pose no dangers to nonbelligerent surface shipping." Thorpe, supra note 8, pp. 263-

264.
23. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, U.S.T. v. 23, p.
701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
24. Hague, International Court ofJustice, Corfu Channel Case ([The Hague]: The Court, 1949), v. 4.
25. Primarily, the Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, U.S.T. v. 13, p. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200.
26. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, A/CONF. 621122 (n.p.: 1982) [hereinafter LOS Convention].
27. At the time of writing, 42 ratifications of the needed 60 have been filed. It should not be overlooked,
however, that some of the provisions of the treaty represent rules of customary international law and
thus may have binding force on that ground.
28. This right is deCmed in article 19 of the LOS Convention, supra note 26, as passage which is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State. The article specifies a number of
activities which could bring the innocence of a vessel's passage into question.
29. LOS Convention, supra note 26, art. 44.
30. See LOS Convention, supra note 26, Part IV.
31. This expression is a term of art, which does not preclude all military activities.
32. Article 301, LOS Convention, supra note 26, requires states to refrain from any threat or use of
force in any manner incompatible with intemationallaw. It would seem that mining might engage this
provision, as well, except in legitimate cases of self-defense.
33. Editorial Comment, Myres McDougal, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of
the Sea," AmericanJournal of International Law, v. 49, p. 356 at p. 361 (1955).
34. See, generally, William O. Miller, "Belligerency and Limited War," in Richard B. Lillich andJohn
Norton Moore, eds., U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, Volume 62, The Use of Force, Human
Rights and General International Legal Issues (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1980), v.
62, p. 164. Miller stresses the problems relating to classifying activities in strict categories of "war" and
"peace."
35. Thorpe, supra note 8, p. 269.
36. Geoffrey E. Carlisle, "The Interrelationship of International Law and U.S. Naval Operations in
Southeast Asia," JAG Journal, v. 22, p. 8 at pp. 11-12 (1967).
37. Thorpe, supra note 8, p. 270.
38. Letter dated 11 May 1972, Doc. S/I0643. United Nations, Security Council, Official Records: Security
Counal, 27th Year, Special Supplement No.1 (New York: 1972), p. 55.
39. Letter dated 12 May 1972, Doc. SII0644, iJ., pp. 55-56.
40. William O. Miller, "Law of Naval Warfare," in Lillich & Moore, supra note 34, p. 263 at p. 269.
41. Quoted in Miller, supra note 34, pp. 170-171.
42. The judgment in the case of "Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America)" can be found in: Hague, International Court ofJustice Yearbook
1985-1986 ([The Hague]: The Court, 1987), pp. 142-160.
43. Richard Grunawalt, "The Rights of Neutrals and Belligerents," Council on Ocean Law and The
Law of the Sea Institute, Transcript of an Evening Panel Discussion on the Persian!Arabian Gulf Tanker War:
International Law or International Chaos, January 26, 1988.

